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Green Technology Diffusion: 
A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons‡  
Jorge L. Contreras1  






We revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented 
environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016, using both 
participant survey and data analytic evidence. Established in January 2008 by several large 
multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248 
patents covering 94 “green” inventions. Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents 
pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable 
environmentally friendly technologies. Our updated results now show that the commons did 
not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from several 
structural and organizational issues. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of 
patent commons in enabling the diffusion of patented technologies more broadly. 
Keywords: patent commons, patent pledge, green technology, eco-patent, diffusion, 
climate change 
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Although patents give their owners the right to exclude others from practicing a patented 
technology, or to charge them for the privilege of doing so, an increasing number of firms 
across different industries have begun to make voluntary pledges intended to limit their 
ability to enforce their patents to the fullest degree (Contreras, 2015). Yet the pledging of 
patents, even to the extent that they will not be asserted against infringers, stops short of 
abandoning or contributing them to the public domain.4 Thus, under a pledge model, also 
referred to as patent commons, patent assets are retained by their owners, who continue to 
incur maintenance and other fees, but the use of such patents for the traditional 
exclusionary purpose is significantly curtailed.5  
Patent commons differ from other mechanisms used to share patents, including cross-
licensing agreements or patent pools in important ways. For example, in both cross-
licensing agreements and patent pools, access to patents is granted only to participating 
companies, although in the case of patent pools, outsiders often can also access the pooled 
patents for a fee. The main difference between these structures and a patent commons, 
therefore, is that the commons typically confers benefits on all third parties, regardless of 
their contribution to the commons and typically without a formal contract.  
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons, including the promotion of broad product 
interoperability through common technical standards, the advocacy of new technology 
platforms, and the pursuit of social goals (Contreras, 2015 and 2018). Over the past few 
decades, significant patent pledges have been made in areas such as open source software 
(e.g., IBM, Sun, Google and Red Hat have each pledged that they will not assert hundreds of 
patents against open source software implementations), electric vehicles (Tesla Motors’ 
famous proclamation that “All our patents are belong to you”(sic)), and biotechnology (e.g., 
Monsanto’s pledge not to assert patents covering genetically modified seeds against 
farmers inadvertently growing them) (see, generally, Contreras, 2015 and 2018). Over the 
years, some collective patent pledges, pledge communities and patent commons have 
achieved significant adoption in the marketplace, while others have not. For example, from 
its inception in 2014 through late 2017, Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) network, in 
which patent holders commit not to transfer their patents to patent assertion entities 
(PAEs), attracted 180 members and more than 180,000 patents (LOT 2018). In contrast, 
                                                        
4 Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated strategy for abandoning unused patents 
(Crouch, 2012). Other coordinated industry efforts, particularly in the biomedical sector, have contributed 
substantial intellectual property assets to the public domain for a variety of reasons (Contreras, 2014). 
5 Patent pledges, including the Eco-Patent Commons, usually contain so-called “defensive suspension” 
provisions that allow pledging companies to deny royalty-free access to other companies that assert their 
patents against the pledging firm. By itself, this phenomenon suggests that some patents are held for purely 
defensive purposes rather than as exclusionary rights. 
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the Defensive Patent License (DPL) network, which was launched in the same year with 
similar goals, has attracted few members (Contreras 2018). The differences in take-up 
between these two pledge communities can be attributed to a variety of factors including 
internal governance mechanisms, commitment details and evangelization (Contreras 2018) 
The Eco-Patent Commons (EcoPC) was an innovative not-for-profit initiative undertaken 
by a small group of large industrial firms with the goal of pledging “green technology” 
patents for broad, royalty-free use in addressing environmental challenges. The thirteen 
EcoPC participants collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology” patents (94 
priority patents or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC between its formation in 2008 and its 
discontinuation in 2016.6 
The EcoPC had the ambitious objective of promoting the diffusion of green technologies to 
increase and accelerate their adoption and to encourage follow-on innovation. The 
theoretical mechanism to achieve all this is simple: by removing a patent owner’s ability to 
assert a patent against any users of the patented technology, the technology -- which had 
been already disclosed by the patent publication -- becomes available for royalty-free use 
to any interested party. In principle, this addresses the well-known welfare cost associated 
with temporary market power granted by patents that likely slows the diffusion of 
patented technology (Hall and Helmers, 2010). 
Following its creation, the EcoPC attracted substantial attention in both the scholarly 
literature (Mattioli, 2012; Hall and Helmers, 2013; Awad, 2015; Contreras, 2015) and the 
popular media (Tripsas, 2009). In addition to accolades, the EcoPC attracted some 
skepticism regarding its potential effectiveness. The skepticism focused on whether a 
commons could offer sufficient incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and thereby 
achieve its ambitious goals. In contrast to other mechanisms designed to share patents, 
such as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners in the EcoPC committed to 
maintain ownership of their patents (which is costly) while making those patents freely 
accessible to third parties including competitors. Some competitive safeguards were left in 
place, notably a defensive termination right in case a different patent was asserted against 
the pledger by another firm using the patented technology. For these reasons, it was not 
obvious what benefits the commons offered to participants beyond reputational 
enhancement. This in turn meant that participants could have had incentives to minimize 
their costs by pledging only patents with little commercial value and allowing them to lapse 
shortly after they were pledged. A second possible benefit might be that those building on 
                                                        
6 Patents are territorial rights, that is, separate patents on the same invention have to be obtained in each 
jurisdiction where patent protection is sought. This means that there often exist multiple patents on the same 
invention, which are referred to as equivalents or patent family. The priority patent describes the first patent 
filing within a given set of equivalents. 
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these technologies might find other (commercial) outputs of the contributing firm useful, 
or might add to a knowledge base from which the firm would benefit.7 
In an earlier study (Hall and Helmers 2013), we studied the characteristics of the patents 
pledged to the EcoPC. This study confirmed that the pledged patents did claim 
environmentally friendly technologies. Moreover, pledged patents were of similar value to 
other patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of lower value than other patents in their 
class, using the usual patent value indicators (based on citations, family size, number of 
patent technology classes, etc.). The findings suggested that the EcoPC participants might 
have pledged patents with the potential to diffuse environmentally friendly technologies 
that were possibly useful to other firms and researchers. 
To study whether the EcoPC increased the diffusion of green technologies, Hall and 
Helmers (2013) looked for changes in forward citations to pledged patents following their 
addition to the commons. They constructed a set of control patents that matched the 
publication authorities, priority years, and technology classes of the EcoPC patents. They 
examined the pattern of citations by subsequent patent applications to the set of EcoPC 
patents and their controls over time, before and after contribution and found that the 
EcoPC patents tended to be cited less than the patents in the control group before 
contribution to the EcoPC. However, the results after contribution were inconclusive, 
because most of the patents were contributed in late 2008 and there was little data post-
pledge as citation data was available only through early 2012, leaving little more than 3 
years of citation data post-pledge.  
In the current study, we revisit the effect of the EcoPC on technology diffusion and assess 
its impact more broadly, using several approaches. The first is a set of interviews with 
participants in the EcoPC and those responsible for it, described in Section 3 of this paper. 
These interviews provide helpful qualitative information that allows us to better 
understand the underlying causes of the EcoPC’s failure to encourage diffusion of pledged 
technologies. The second is an updated look at the data on the patents pledged to the 
EcoPC, described mainly in sections 4 and 5. With the passage of time, substantially more 
citation data has become available (through 2016 as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and 
Helmers (2013)). This allows us to reexamine the data and provide a more definitive 
answer to the question whether the commons has had any effect on technology diffusion, at 
least as reflected in subsequent patenting. The fact that the EcoPC was discontinued in 
2016 while during the same time several new commons were created also motivates us to 
revisit the viability of such patent commons more generally. Finally, we asked inventors of 
                                                        
7 Belenzon (2006) shows that focal firm citations to patents that cite a focal firm’s patents are positively 
valued by the market, suggesting this kind of feedback effect from others’ use of the firm’s technology. 
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the patents that cite any of the EcoPC patents after they were pledged about the role that 
the pledge has played in their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as prior art.  
To summarize our main findings: we do not find any evidence that the EcoPC increased the 
diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged patents are cited less than the matched control 
patents before they enter the commons, suggesting that they were already less valuable, 
and their pledge does not change this. Inventors of citing patents unanimously indicated 
that the pledge, i.e. royalty-free access, did not affect their decision to rely on an EcoPC 
patent as prior art. In fact, none of the inventors that responded to our query were even 
aware that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC and hence royalty-free access played no 
role in their decision to rely on it as prior art. These results suggest that the commons had 
no effect on technology diffusion. Looking at the EcoPC priority patents, 82 per cent had 
lapsed by July 2017 due to expiration (26 per cent), rejection or withdrawal (18 per cent), 
or non-payment of renewal fees (38 per cent). This indicates that participating companies 
in most cases did not consider the benefits of the commons sufficiently large to maintain 
the patents in force and expired patents were not replaced by new patent pledges. Our 
interviews with representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal several common critiques 
of the EcoPC’s structure and operational processes that help explain our quantitative 
findings, particularly EcoPC’s inability to provide information regarding the usage of 
contributed technologies.8 Another major impediment to diffusion was the lack of 
information provided by pledging companies beyond the patent documents that could have 
helped potential users (especially in developing countries) see potential applications of the 
pledged technologies. Finally, no concerted effort was made to group or link patents in the 
commons to any particular technology. This lack of coordination may have limited 
synergies that could have been created through a more deliberate approach to the 
technologies covered by contributed patents.  
This study both updates our previous work and fills gaps in our understanding of the 
functioning and performance of the EcoPC and patent commons more generally. Providing 
a more definitive answer to the question of diffusion and the functioning of the EcoPC more 
broadly is important for several reasons. First, it offers insight regarding the manner in 
which patent pledges can support the diffusion and implementation of (green) technologies 
around the world. Second, it can inform the design of other pledge communities both in the 
environmental space and other key technology areas, such as electric vehicles, software, 
biotechnology, and agriculture. Third, it informs us more generally about the viability of 
patent commons created by for-profit companies as a mechanism to share access to 
patented technology 
                                                        
8 This feature of the commons also limits our ability to study their subsequent use, which is why we chose to 
focus on citations to these patents, which is public data. 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional 
design and history of the EcoPC. Section 3 summarizes the findings from our interviews of 
participants in the EcoPC. In Sections 4 and 5 we turn to a quantitative analysis of these 
patents and their citations and discuss the results of our inventor survey. Section 6 offers a 
few concluding thoughts that emerge from our analysis for the design and functioning of 
patent commons.  
2. The Eco-Patent Commons: Structure and Development9 
The concept for the EcoPC as a collective mechanism for permitting broad usage of patents 
covering environmental technologies was originally developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as 
one of several corporate initiatives directed toward environmental protection and 
sustainability (IBM 2010). Given IBM’s well-known patent strength,10 a program to 
promote environmental causes would capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets. 
IBM had already made significant commitments to the sharing of patents and other 
intellectual property (IP) in the area of open source code software (Merges 2004; Wen et al. 
2013; Contreras 2015). Accordingly, extending these initiatives to the environmental area 
was consistent with IBM’s existing corporate culture.11 
The idea behind the EcoPC is that industrial firms with large patent portfolios likely hold 
patents covering technologies with environmental applications, but because those 
technologies are not core to the firm’s business, they are languishing unused. If, however, 
the patents covering these technologies could be made freely available to users around the 
world, then a significant public service could be rendered at a minimal cost to the patent 
holder. 
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC at its Global Innovation Outlook 
conference in 2006 (IBM 2008). It then initiated discussions with other large firms with 
which it had existing business ties and which it believed might be sympathetic to a 
collective approach to making environmental technologies more broadly available. In 
January 2008, IBM announced the launch of the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney Bowes 
                                                        
9 The material in this section is derived both from the works cited and also from the interviews described in 
Part 3, below. Additional information regarding the organization and history of the EcoPC can be found in 
Mattioli (2012), Hall and Helmers (2013) and Awad (2015). 
10 According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, IBM regularly receives more U.S. patent grants 
than any other company in the world, about 7,000-8,000 patents per year in 2014-2016. 
11 The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open source movement, noting in its promotional materials “As 
has been demonstrated by the open source software community, the free sharing of knowledge can provide a 
fertile ground for new collaboration and innovation. Sharing environmental patents can help others become 
more eco-efficient and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner—enabling technology 
innovation to meet social innovation.” (EcoPC 2017). 
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and Sony (IBM 2008). A total of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC as summarized 
in Table 1, below. 
Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC 
 
Firm Date Joining EcoPC No. Patents Pledged* 
IBM Jan. 14, 2008 29 
Nokia Jan. 14, 2008 1 
Pitney Bowes Jan. 14, 2008 2 
Sony Jan. 14, 2008 4 
Bosch Sept. 8, 2008 24 
DuPont‡ Sept. 8, 2008 11 
Xerox Sept. 8, 2008 13 
Taisei Mar. 23,2009 2 
Ricoh Mar. 23, 2009 1 
Dow Oct. 20, 2009 1 
Fuji Xerox Oct. 20, 2009 2 
Hewlett-Packard July 1, 2010 3 
Hitachi‡ July 25, 2011 1 
* Priority patents (i.e. patent families).  
‡ DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of 
management from WBCSD to ELI. 
   
The stated mission of EcoPC was “to manage a collection of patents pledged for 
unencumbered use by companies and IP rights holders around the world to make it easier 
and faster to innovate and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the 
global environment.” (EcoPC, 2013b). Accordingly, patents eligible for inclusion in the 
EcoPC were required to belong to one of sixty enumerated International Patent 
Classification (IPC) codes12 relating to environmental or sustainability technology. 
Technologies sought by the EcoPC included energy conservation, pollution control, 
environmentally-friendly materials, water or materials use or reduction, and recyclability 
(EcoPC, 2013b). 248 patents were pledged to the EcoPC, with the last such contribution 
occurring in 2011 (see Part 4 below).13 
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner was required to make an irrevocable covenant 
not to assert the patent – or “any worldwide counterparts” (EcoPC, 2013a) -- against any 
infringing machine, manufacture process or composition of matter that 
“reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste generation 
or pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).” (EcoPC, 2013a). This being 
                                                        
12 The IPC system divides technologies into eight principal sections with approximately 70,000 subcategories. 
13 This number is arrived at as follows: there were 238 patents pledged at the time of our work in Hall and 
Helmers (2013). Since then, Hewlett-Packard added 9 and Hitachi 1, for a total of 248. 
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said, patent owners retained the (defensive termination) right to assert pledged patents 
against (a) any EcoPC participant that asserted any environmental patent against them, or 
(b) any non-EcoPC participant that asserted any patent against them (EcoPC, 2013a).14  
 
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), a Geneva-based non-governmental organization focused on 
environmental and sustainability issues. WBCSD’s initial duties consisted primarily of 
hosting the EcoPC web site and promoting EcoPC to other WBCSD members for purposes of 
recruitment. WBCSD publicized the EcoPC among its members and attracted several of the 
participants that joined following the EcoPC’s formation (see Table 1). 
Participation in the EcoPC was open to all individuals and companies in the world, the only 
requirement for participation being the pledging of one or more patents according to the 
EcoPC’s rules.15 Neither membership in WBCSD nor any additional dues or charges were 
required for EcoPC participation. The EcoPC itself was characterized as an unincorporated, 
non-profit association (EcoPC, 2013b). 
In 2013, the administration of EcoPC was transferred from WBCSD to the Environmental 
Law Institute (ELI), a Washington, D.C.-based trade and advocacy organization. This 
transition was apparently orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a member of 
WBCSD, thereby eliminating the primary driver of WBCSD’s involvement. ELI, of which IBM 
was a significant member, hosted the EcoPC web site from 2013 through 2016, but was not 
actively engaged in recruiting new participants. Two EcoPC members, Hitachi and DuPont, 
withdrew from the EcoPC at the time of this administrative shift. No new patents were 
contributed to the EcoPC after Hitachi’s initial 2011 contribution. By 2016, very little 
activity was occurring at the EcoPC. Accordingly, in 2016, the EcoPC was formally 
discontinued (EcoPC, 2016).16 
Though the EcoPC has been shut down, pursuant to the EcoPC Ground Rules and pledge 
terms, the “irrevocable” non-assertion pledge made with respect to each pledged patent 
will continue in accordance with its terms indefinitely.17 
                                                        
14 This is a so-called “defensive termination” provision. 
15 Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a Membership Application/Pledge Form which bound 
them to comply with the EcoPC’s Non-Assert Pledge, Ground Rules and Governance Structure (EcoPC, 2013a). 
16 Based on our interviews (see Part 3 below), we understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted by 
IBM regarding the decision to wind-down the EcoPC. Apparently there was no resistance to this course of 
action. 
17 The Ground Rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge will survive that owner’s withdrawal 
from the EcoPC (EcoPC 2013a (“voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to any 
approved pledged patent(s) – the non-assert survives and remains in force”). For example, Hitachi pledged a 




This section of the paper describes the results of a series of semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of participating companies, WBCSD and ELI.18 Here we focus on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the EcoPC that were identified by interviewees with a view to 
informing our interpretation of our quantitative results on the diffusion of pledged 
technologies. Additional findings from our interviews are summarized in Contreras et al. 
(2018).  
3.1 Methodology 
We identified individuals employed by EcoPC corporate participants who had been 
personally involved with their employer’s decision to join the EcoPC and/or its ongoing 
participation in the EcoPC. Through online searches and informal inquiries we were able to 
obtain valid and current contact details for representatives of nine of the thirteen EcoPC 
corporate participants. Seven of these individuals consented to be interviewed for this 
study (five by telephone and two by written correspondence).19 In addition, we 
interviewed representatives of WBCSD and ELI who were directly involved in EcoPC 
activities.20 
The information gathered in this way is not necessarily representative of the views held by 
all member companies of the EcoPC as there is the possibility that interviewees selected 
into our sample based on their own, subjective views of the performance of the EcoPC. That 
said, we obtained information from a relatively diverse sampling of company 
representatives (relative to the number of people involved in the project) across different 
geographical regions (companies based in the U.S., Europe and Japan) and are therefore 
optimistic that these interviews offer relevant information with regard to at least a 
significant portion of the EcoPC participants’ views regarding the organization. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
patent to the EcoPC in 2011, but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent should remain pledged. See 
Contreras (2015: 598). 
18 Interviews were conducted by Contreras pursuant to a determination of “no human subject research” by 
the University of Utah Institutional Review Board (Jun. 26, 2017, IRB 00102447). Interview subject 
information is held by Contreras. 
19 The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the individuals interviewed or the EcoPC 
participant companies that they represented, with the exception of IBM, given its central role in forming and 
managing the EcoPC. 
20 Interview scripts differed for individuals representing EcoPC participants versus administrators. Each 
interview lasted approximately thirty to sixty minutes. Responses were coded by the interviewer. No 
compensation was offered to interview subjects. 




Most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a valuable demonstration of corporate willingness 
to collaborate to achieve environmental and sustainability goals. The public relations 
benefits of EcoPC participation were also viewed as valuable by some companies. However, 
each of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with at least some aspects of the EcoPC 
which help explain its failure to encourage the diffusion of the pledged technologies and 
ultimately the EcoPC’s shutdown: 
a. Membership and Recruitment. At its height in 2011, the EcoPC had thirteen 
corporate participants. Though these firms were all major global enterprises with large 
patent portfolios, they still represented only a tiny fraction of the total potential 
membership in the organization. Particularly given that the EcoPC charged no membership 
fee, it was somewhat puzzling that so few firms joined. While WBCSD did appear to 
promote membership in the EcoPC, few of WBCSD’s many members elected to join. Based 
on our discussions with EcoPC members, we believe that possible impediments to 
recruitment were (a) the perceived difficulty and expense of identifying suitable patents 
for contribution, (b) a belief among potential members that they lacked patents that were 
suitable for contribution, and (c) an aversion to the idea of contributing potentially 
valuable patents to the EcoPC without compensation, a view generally held by legal and IP 
departments. 
b. No Tracking of Usage. All respondents observed that there was no effective way to 
determine whether the technologies covered by patents pledged to the EcoPC had been 
utilized.21 As a result, it was difficult for them to draw conclusions regarding whether the 
EcoPC was worth the effort, and to determine whether the goals of improving 
environmental conditions and sustainability were being met. Moreover, without clear 
success metrics, it was difficult to justify devoting ongoing effort to the EcoPC to upper 
management at some companies. Several respondents indicated that the EcoPC made a 
conscious decision not to require users to register with the web site or report back to the 
EcoPC, as it was felt that such requirements would serve as barriers to use of the web site.  
WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to the EcoPC web site and shared this information 
with the participants.22 However, as noted above, identifying information about visitors 
was not collected, and it was not clear whether visitors were academics, students, 
attorneys, journalists or potential users of technology. 
                                                        
21 This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s formation (Bowman, 2009). 
22 We analyzed the data on web hits in our earlier study to find a highly skewed distribution of hits, only 36 
patents received any hits. Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between web hits 
and forward citations by other patents (Hall and Helmers, 2013). 
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c. Website not User-Friendly. It was noted that the cataloging of patents on the EcoPC 
web site, which was organized by contributing company rather than technology area, was 
not particularly intuitive or informative. It required potential users to look up the relevant 
patents one by one in order to understand the technology being offered. Moreover, usually 
only a single patent family member was listed, requiring users to identify the remaining 
members themselves. This procedure would have required both substantial effort on the 
part of potential users, as well as a high degree of familiarity with the format and 
terminology of patent documents.23 As documented by Hall and Helmers (2013), the 
website also listed a number of erroneous patent numbers, another potential source of 
frustration for users.  
d. No Technology Transfer. Another issue raised by several respondents was that the 
EcoPC sought to promote the dissemination of green technologies through patents alone. 
Yet complex technologies often cannot be understood and implemented, especially by non-
experts working in the developing world, only through patent disclosures (McManis and 
Contreras 2014). Some form of technology assistance or transfer is generally required to 
enable local users to take advantage of patented technologies, or even to realize that such 
technologies are available and applicable to local problems. One of the issues that emerged 
in this regard was uncertainty regarding the intended users of the EcoPC system. 
Several of the individuals we interviewed believed that intended users of EcoPC technology 
would be from the developing world. Yet this belief evidences a misunderstanding of the 
global patent system. Patents prevent usage of a patented technology only in the countries 
where patents are issued. Most companies do not seek patent protection in the least-
developed countries, either because protection is uncertain in those countries, or because 
their markets are underdeveloped and the cost of procuring patent protection is not 
viewed as cost effective. Even in middle income countries, multinationals tend to focus on 
pharmaceutical patenting and patenting in specific areas where the country in question is 
competitive (Hall and Helmers 2018; Abud et al. 2013). Accordingly, many technologies 
that are patented in the developed world are not themselves patented in the developing 
world. This general rule certainly applies to the patents contributed to the EcoPC, most of 
which have “family” members throughout the developed world (North America, Europe, 
Asia Pacific – see Table 4 below), but few if any patent family members in the developing 
world. Thus, organizations in the developing world already have the right to seek to exploit 
many technologies disclosed in patents filed in the developed world. But they do not do so 
because, as discussed above, the utilization of even moderately complex technologies is not 
possible without significant training and technology transfer activity that is not 
                                                        
23 It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly at the present time, since Google patent 
search now includes the members of the patent family in its results. However, this feature was not available 
during most of the life of the EcoPC.  
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accomplished through the grant of patent rights alone. In addition, technologies patented in 
the developed world may not be targeted to needs in the developing world without 
extensive further development.  
4. Data 
For the purpose of our quantitative analysis in Section 5 below, we updated the database 
used in Hall and Helmers (2013). This means that for comparison purposes, we restricted 
the set of patents to all patents pledged prior to July 2010, which excludes the 4 families 
pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.24 We also included the original control patents, 
which had been obtained by propensity score matching on priority year, IPC subclass, and 
publication authority. 
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat complex, partly because the original data 
were drawn from a PATSTAT version with non-permanent identifiers, and partly because 
PATSTAT itself changes over time, with some data disappearing due to changes in the data 
at the contributing national or regional patent offices. In addition, the list of patents on the 
EcoPC website appears to have changed slightly, to some extent in response to our 
comments on the original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). We used the April 2017 PATSTAT 
version and identified a correspondence between the prior identifying numbers and the 
permanent (as of April 2011) identifiers using information on the application number and 
authority of the relevant patents. In a few cases, we were unable to find the application 
number-authority combination on the new version of PATSTAT. There were 4 such 
applications from the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), which apparently had been withdrawn 
and are no longer on their website.25 We included them in our forward citation analysis as 
having zero cites, for completeness. In addition, 24 applications from the Australian Patent 
Office (APO) were reduced to 12 applications in the new PATSTAT file. Most of these 
problems affected the control patents rather than the Eco-patents. 
The resulting dataset contains 698 applications rather than the original 711, with the 
distribution shown in Table 2. 
                                                        
24 In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever listed on EcoPC’s public web site. All 
versions of the EcoPC list of patents that we were able to locate using web archive tools were current only as 
of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining. 
25 One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones, is that the numbering systems are 
quite complex and some numbers are apparently reused occasionally (See 
http://www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_no_search.htm for further information on Japanese 
patent numbering). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet and Google patents websites. We 
also found that at least two of the equivalent patents we had identified for the controls became utility model 
patents when they were granted in Japan.  
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Table 2: Dataset construction 
 
Note: Controls matched based on the publication authorities, priority years, 
and IPC classes of the EcoPC patents. 
From Table 2, one can see that although the set of applications has changed slightly, we still 
have the same number of equivalent groups for the patents to be analyzed. It is also clear 
that the number of citations to both the EcoPC patents and controls has grown 
considerably, more than doubling in both cases (see Section 5.2 below for further analysis 
of the citations). 
For our inventor survey, we extracted from PATSTAT the names of all inventors of all 329 
patents that cited an EcoPC patent after the patent had been pledged to the commons. We 
then focus only on those patents where the citation to the EcoPC patent was not added by 
the examiner (see also Section 5.2). This left us with 141 patents (43 per cent). After 
undertaking some name cleaning and harmonization, we obtained a total of 271 inventors. 
We then searched the web for their contact information. We were able to send our short 
questionnaire, which consisted of only three questions, to 71 (26 per cent) inventors. We 
obtained responses from 13 inventors, a response rate of 18 per cent. However, only 10 of 
these 13 inventors agreed to answer our questionnaire. These 10 inventors worked for 
four different EcoPC member companies: three inventors worked for Bosch, three for IBM, 
three for DuPont and one for Xerox. These are the four firms that contributed the largest 
number of patents to the commons (Table 2). We summarize the results briefly in section 
5.2 below. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we use the data on patents pledged to the EcoPC and their matched controls 
to analyze (1) the legal status of EcoPC patents to gauge whether member companies 
considered continued ownership of their pledged patents as sufficiently important to incur 
Old (2011 data) New (2017 data)
Number of applications 711 698
   Controls 473 461
   Eco-patents 238 237
Num of equivalence groups 184 184
   Controls 94 94
   Eco-patents 90 90
Number of citations 1872 4056
   Controls 1205 2713
   Eco-patents 667 1343
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407 
14 
 
the associated costs and (2) the diffusion of the technologies protected by patents pledged 
to the EcoPC as measured by citations received from other patents. 
 
5. 1 Legal status of the pledged patents 
 
We begin by looking at the legal status of the EcoPC pledged patents as of July 2017, 
summarized in Table 3. We collected these data from PATSTAT’s legal status tables of April 
2017 and supplemented the information using web searches. The WO (PCT) patents in our 
database will not have a post-grant legal status since they are granted on a national basis, 
and a few patent applications from the JPO could not be found, probably because the 
PATSTAT entries were for translations or they were utility model applications in Japan, 
even though they might have been patent applications elsewhere. There are 15 such 
patents for which we do not have legal status, or legal status is meaningless. Of the 
remaining 221 patent applications, almost 20 percent of the 90 priority patents were still 
in force as of July 2017, but only 11 percent of all the equivalent patents. Of the 27 patents 
still in force or pending, 12 are US patents, 6 are Japanese, 4 are European Patent Office 
(EPO) or German, and the remainder are Chinese (1), Russian (2), Mexican (1), and Korean 
(1). Almost half the patents have expired for nonpayment of fees, although almost as many 
expired at the end of their terms.  
Table 3 
 
All Priority All Priority
pending 8 3 3.4% 3.3%
granted and in force 19 14 8.1% 15.6%
  Total still active 27 17 11.4% 18.9%
nonpayment of fees 90 29 38.1% 32.2%
expired at term 61 30 25.8% 33.3%
rejected 18 7 7.6% 7.8%
withdrawn 24 7 10.2% 7.8%
   Total not active 193 73 81.8% 81.1%
Missing (from JPO)* 5 0 2.1% 0.0%
WO applications 11 0 4.7% 0.0%
   Total   236 90
* These appear to be translation entries or util ity models. 
Legal status of eco-patents - July 2017
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In Figure 1, we show the distribution of patent lifetimes (approximated by the lapse 
(expiration or nonpayment) dates minus the application filing date).26 In the case of 
patents still in force, we measured the lifetime to July 2017. The distribution is fairly flat for 
those patents that did not remain in force for their full terms. A substantial number of 
patents remained in force for either the full 20-year patent term or a significant portion of 
it. This suggests that in many cases, companies decided to pay renewal fees to keep the 
patents in force even after they had been pledged to the EcoPC.27 For example JP4696713 
“Wastewater treatment process” by Fuji Xerox is still in force in 4 out of 5 jurisdictions in 
which it was filed. Other patents still in force include Sony’s JP3876497 “Flocculating agent 
and a method for flocculation” which was granted in early 2007 or IBM’s US6294028 
“Mercury process gold ballbond removal apparatus” which was granted in 2001 and 
maintained in force throughout the entire lifetime of the EcoPC. However, there are also 
patents such as US5050676 “Apparatus for two phase vacuum extraction of soil 
contaminants” owned by Xerox; the patent has 5 equivalents, 4 of which had expired before 
the patent was pledged, and the remaining patent expired at term less than a year and a 
half after the patent was pledged and no maintenance fees were payable during that time. 
This is an example of the pledge of a patent that had most likely no longer any value to the 
company. 
                                                        
26 Most offices now have a common patent term: 20 years from filing date, but there are various exceptions, 
and older patents in our sample may have been issued under different rules. When we were able to obtain the 
actual expiration date, we used that (most cases). 
27 Renewal fees usually increase over time, at the USPTO for example, large entities pay US$1,600 to maintain 
a patent inforce after 4 years after grant and US$7,400 12 years after grant. 






Figure 2 breaks down the different reasons why patents lapsed. It shows that a significant 
number of patents have expired since 2007, the year before the EcoPC was launched. A few 
patents were rejected by the relevant patent offices or were withdrawn by applicants, but 
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Table 4 shows the geographic coverage of the EcoPC patents. 90 percent of the priority 
patent applications were made to the 4 most important jurisdictions: the US, Germany, 
Japan, and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account for 80 percent of the patents overall. 
There is very little evidence that the patents in the commons ever covered less-developed 
countries. The only patents in middle income countries are in Brazil (7), Mexico (4), and 
Argentina (1), and there are none in low income countries. So patents cannot have been an 
obstacle to the use of technologies in less-developed countries.  
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Table 4: Application authority distribution 
 
 
5.2 Technology diffusion and follow-on innovation 
 
Next we reexamine the question of technology diffusion by looking at the updated citation 
data. Our analysis in Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that pledged patents protect 
environmentally friendly technologies that could have the potential to be adopted for use 
by third parties. To analyze any effect on diffusion, we adopt a difference-in-differences 
estimation, comparing the number of forward citations received by patents pledged to the 
EcoPC before and after they were pledged to citations received by the set of matched 
control patents that were not pledged to the EcoPC. Our estimation approach allows for 
different citation patterns between the set of EcoPC and control patents before the EcoPC 
patents were pledged. This accounts for concerns that pre-pledge citation behavior could 
be correlated with the decision to pledge a given patent to the EcoPC. 
Authority Priorities All
USA US 34 75
Germany DE 20 45
Japan JP 17 34
EPO EP 10 34
South Korea KR 2 7
China CN 2 3
Austria AT 1 4
Spain ES 1 4
UK GB 1 2
Norway NO 1 2
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Table 5 shows a comparison of standard patent characteristics between the set of patents 
pledged to the EcoPC and the matched (by priority year, IPC subclass, and publication 
authority) control patents where we focus on the priority patents (Table A-1 in the 
appendix shows the data for all equivalents). There are no statistically significant 
differences between the grant lag, the number of backward or non-patent literature 
references between the two sets of patents. Interestingly, EcoPC patents are more likely to 
be pursued until grant. However, control patents have a larger family size and a larger 
number of claims both of which are commonly used patent value indicators. This suggests 
that the EcoPC patents potentially are of less value than otherwise comparable patents. 
When we look at the number of forward citations received, the set of control patents 




Table 6 below shows the share of EcoPC and control patents that receive any citations as 
well as the average number of citations received (Table A-2 in the appendix shows a 
comparison of patent characteristics for patents with non-zero forward citations). As 
indicated earlier, compared to Table 6 in Hall and Helmers (2013), there are slightly fewer 
equivalents of our EcoPC patents and controls due to missing data and the consolidation at 
the APO. The share of patents that have citations has increased, becoming close to 90 per 
cent for the equivalence groups, and the average citations per equivalence group has more 






Application year 1998.9 1998.8 -0.10 (0.68) 0.882 0.01 0.920
D (granted) 0.51 0.73 0.22 (0.07) 0.002 6.42 0.011
Grant lag in years* 3.93 3.74 -0.19 (0.55) 0.725 1.25 0.264
Family size 5.24 3.78 -1.47 (0.62) 0.018 4.54 0.033
Number of claims* 23.61 14.60 -9.01 (3.87) 0.023 2.88 0.090
Forward patent cites 22.67 13.22 -9.44 (4.04) 0.021 2.25 0.134
Backward patent cites 7.39 5.63 -1.76 (2.07) 0.397 1.74 0.187
Non-patent references 2.50 1.10 -1.40 (1.33) 0.294 0.02 0.903
Number of applicants 1.10 1.04 -0.06 (0.09) 0.553 0.02 0.899
Number of inventors* 2.70 3.00 0.30 (0.28) 0.294 2.12 0.145
# A few control observations (5 in total) were lost due to missing data.
* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.
Mean patent characteristics for 89 Eco-patents and 90 control patents#
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as well as probable improvements in the PATSTAT coverage itself, but also highlights our 
much improved ability to assess the question of technology diffusion as a result of the 
EcoPC.  
 
Table 6: Citation counts for EcoPC patents and controls 
 
 
Table 7 and Figure 3 below show the key results of our new analysis. Poisson and negative 
binomial models of citations at the patent-level show that EcoPC patents are half as likely 
to be cited than the controls (an elasticity of 0.4-0.6), and even less likely after donation, 
although this last result is only marginally significant. These regressions control for both 
priority year and the citation lag using dummies.  
It is well-known that the citation lag distribution for patents has a somewhat smooth 
structure, rising at first to a peak at 3-5 years and then declining slowly. We therefore 
attempt to improve the precision of our estimates by imposing the Jaffe-Trajtenberg model 
of citation diffusion and decline (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) rather than using the citation 
lag dummies. This model, shown in the final three columns of Table 7, uses a parametric 
model for the citation lag that is given by the following equation: 
 
0 1 1 2 2
(1 ) ( ) exp[ (1 ) ][1 exp( (1 ) s)]
st eco eco after after e eco e eco st
c D D f t D s Db d d b b b b e= + + - + - + +   
Where t is the priority year of the cited patent, s is the citation lag, and cst is the citation rate 








Eco-patents 237 90 73.0% 85.6% 1343
Controls 461 94 57.1% 93.6% 2713
Eco-patents 10.5 17.4 5.7 14.9
Controls 13.2 30.8 5.9 28.9
*Average over patents with nonzero citations.
**Average over all  patents
Citations are measured as all  forward citations in the patent l iterature between the 
application date and April/May 2017, adjusted for citations by equivalent patents in 
other jurisdictions. 
Total patents Share with citations
Average citations* Average citations**
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407 
21 
 
as a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit of observation is the average cites per 
patents with a given priority year, citation lag, and patent type (EcoPC patent before and 
after or control). Prior experience with this specification suggests that although it is an 
appealing model in that it captures both the initial increase in citation due to knowledge 
diffusion and the decline due to knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate successfully 
(Hall et al. 2001). We do it in two ways: (1) nonlinear least squares with a dependent 
variable equal to average cites per patent, and (2) Poisson with a dependent variable equal 
to the total cites at the given lag to patents with a given priority year. In the latter case we 
multiply the right hand side of the model by the number of patents, so the models are 
equivalent. The results from the two estimation strategies are similar. Once we impose a 
model on the citation lag, the EcoPC patents are cited an average of 25 per cent less than 
the controls, and there is no change after donation. The decay (obsolescence) and diffusion 
parameters are similar to those obtained by Hall et al. (2001) for the US patent data, with 
obsolescence increasing by about 5 per cent per year, and diffusion about 50 per cent. 
However, keep in mind that one reason the first is relatively low and the second relatively 
high is that there is a secular growth in citations that is not completely captured by the 
priority year dummies. That is, this model imposes a fixed citation lag structure on the data 
which is then allowed to be higher or lower, depending on priority year and EcoPC status. 
Because citations are often added by examiners rather than applicants,28 we also report 
results in Appendix Table A-3 and Figure B-1 where we retain only citations made by 
applicants. That said, the results are very similar to the ones reported in Table 7 and Figure 
3; there is no evidence of increased diffusion of patents after they were pledged to the 
EcoPC. 
                                                        
28 Note that for the purposes of analyzing diffusion, it is preferable to include citations added by examiners 
because these citations also indicate that the citing patent builds on the cited prior art where this relationship 
was identified by examiners who are commonly experts in the relevant technology areas. 
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EcoPC patent -0.60 (0.11) *** -0.42 (0.10) *** -0.33 (0.09) *** -0.22 (0.04) *** -0.25 (0.05) ***
EcoPC patent after 
donation -0.35 (0.21) -0.33 (0.17) * -0.10 (0.18)  -0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Decay parameter 0.07 (0.02) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) ***
Diffusion parameter 0.49 (0.21) ** 0.76 (0.19) *** 0.64 (0.21) ***
EcoPC decay 0.47 (0.38)





Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Semi-parametric Jaffe-Trajtenberg
Cites Cites Cites/patent Cites Cites
yes yes no no no
Poisson Negative binomial NLLS Poisson Poisson
12068.6
Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between 
1992 and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three 
columns a priority year-citing year.
yes yes yes yes
-6,143.0 -3,745.2 -845.6 12,062.8
yes








1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Cites per patent by citing year (as of May 2017)
Controls Eco-patents Entry date Controls fitted Eco-pats fitted
Donation
year
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Table 7 and Figure 3 show that there is little change in aggregate citation differences 
between EcoPC patents and controls before and after being pledged to the commons, 
although EcoPC patents are cited less overall. It is important to remember, however, that 
because the pledging firms retain a defensive termination right, there may be continuing 
innovation building on these patents that does not result in new patent applications (and 
citations). That is, there are limits created on the enforcement of patent rights by the firms 
that use the technologies in these patents, which may reduce the benefits of subsequent 
patenting, and thus reduce citations to the pledged patent. This issue is related to a broader 
problem: our analysis of diffusion only looks for diffusion that leads to follow-on 
innovation that is patented. This excludes simple use of pledged patented technologies and 
even follow-on innovation if it does not lead to a patent filing. However, in the absence of 
any information on the use of pledged patents (see Section 3 above), the forward citation 
analysis is the only way to quantitatively assess the impact of the patent pledge on 
diffusion. 
It is also possible that the nature of the citation changes, in that the technology in the 
patents becomes more useful to individuals and non-profit institutions given the absence of 
royalty requirements. We investigate this question by looking at the source of the citations 
to the EcoPC patents and controls before and after donation. We divide the cites into five 
groupings according to their source: self-citations from the firm that owns the pledged 
patent, citations from other EcoPC participants, citations from other firms, citations from 
individual patentees, and citations from non-profit institutions (universities, hospitals, 
public research organizations (PROs), and governments). We then define the before and 
after period for each grouping of citations according to the relation between the earliest 
priority date for the citing patent and the date the cited patent was donated to the 
commons. The results are shown in Table 8. In some cases, sample sizes are fairly small, 
but it does appear that self-citation falls relative to all the other categories, with the largest 
(percentage) increases in citations by other EcoPC participants and non-profit institutions.  
One issue that arises when counting the source of citations is that many patents have 
multiple applicants of different types. Given the nonrivalry of knowledge, which implies 
that one citer’s use of the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use by another citer, it 
might be appropriate to simply count all the applicant-citations as citations as we did in the 
first panel of Table 8. Nevertheless we also show a weighted version of the table in the 
second panel where the weights are proportional to the inverse of the number of applicants 
on the citing patent.29 Although the distribution of cites changes dramatically when we 
weight, due to the tendency of individuals to share in applications, the qualitative 
conclusions with respect to the post-commons citing behavior are the same.  
                                                        
29 We removed individual inventor-applicants where there was also a firm applicant before computing the 
weights, on the grounds that these applicants usually are employed by the firm in question. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407 
24 
 
As described earlier, in order to validate our quantitative results, we asked the inventors of 
patents that cited an EcoPC patent after they were pledged (a) whether they were aware of 
the citation (we exclude citations added by examiners), (b) if they were aware of the 
citation, whether they knew that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC, and (c) if they had 
answered (a) and (b) affirmatively, whether the fact that the EcoPC patent was available for 
use royalty-free played any role in their decision to rely on it as prior art. As explained in 
Section 4 above, we obtained valid responses from 10 inventors; 50% indicated that they 
were aware of the citation, but none of them was aware that the cited patent was part of 
the EcoPC. While the sample of inventors is obviously very small, it nevertheless confirms 
our quantitative results: the pledge of a patent to the EcoPC was ineffective in spurring the 
diffusion of the patented invention. In fact, the responses from the inventors also confirm 
the results of our interviews with company representatives as they suggest that inventors 





The results of our empirical analysis suggest fairly strongly that the technologies covered 
by the contributed patents did not in fact attract a lot of interest by third parties, even 
before contribution to the commons. As a result, pledging these patents to the commons 
did not affect the interest of third parties in their underlying technologies and hence the 
commons did not promote their use and diffusion. 
One of the reasons for the EcoPC’s lack of effectiveness is the fact that it was conceived and 
implemented by the suppliers of technology as a volunteer effort without consulting the 
demand side (potential users of these patents/technologies). As such, the EcoPC was 


















Self-citation 141 24 9.9% 4.6% 127.1 12.9 12.3% 3.9%
Other eco-patent firm 11 13 0.8% 2.5% 8.0 7.3 0.8% 2.2%
Other firm 645 248 45.1% 47.1% 627.5 229.8 60.5% 68.8%
Individual 589 219 41.2% 41.6% 243.0 71.7 23.4% 21.5%
Institution 43 22 3.0% 4.2% 31.7 12.4 3.1% 3.7%
Total 1429 526 1037.3 334.1
These totals are for cites to the contributed eco-patents only.
Weighted cites are weighted according to the number of applicants. 
Weighted
Citation to the eco-patents by citer type
Unweighted
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available technologies could be used. It simply offered a passive web site with patent 
listings, rather than suggestions how these technologies could be utilized, either separately 
or together.30 Our results suggest that effective technology diffusion requires more than 
patent non-assertion, especially in the developing world. Technical assistance and know-
how are essential for implementing environmental technologies to an even greater degree 
than for software or pharma (Barton et al., 2002; McManis and Contreras, 2014) and patent 
disclosures alone are seldom sufficient to enable someone to implement a technology 
effectively (see Ouellette, 2012 for the results of a survey of patent readers). 
Likewise, there was little or no coordination among EcoPC contributors regarding the 
technologies covered by the patents they were contributing. As discussed in Hall and 
Helmers (2013), the pledged patents appeared to largely protect different technologies. 
Hence, the implementation of a given technology might not have been possible using only 
pledged patents (i.e., any of the covered technologies could require the use of additional 
patents not contributed to the commons). As a result, synergies that could have emerged 
from the contribution of multiple patents covering selected technologies did not emerge. 
Perhaps the most cogent critique of the EcoPC was its lack of tracking of patent utilization. 
Without knowledge of how/whether patents were being utilized, companies could not 
justify expending further effort on the activity. Moreover, even the public relations benefit 
of belonging to the EcoPC waned after the initial contributions, given that there were no 
‘success stories’ to promote. More generally, the lack of information on usage meant that it 
was very difficult to gauge the success of the initiative and to make adjustments to its 
structure and management to improve its performance. Finally, the lack of demonstrable 
results from the project eroded the potential public relations benefits that member firms 
may have hoped to achieve from participation in the EcoPC.  
This lack of usage tracking underscores another weakness of the EcoPC, especially when 
compared to more successful pledge communities: the lack of dedicated administrative and 
managerial resources devoted to expanding and promoting the commons. While EcoPC was 
housed within well-established organizations such as WBCSD and ELI, these organizations 
received no additional compensation for managing EcoPC and appear to have taken on this 
role as an accommodation to a significant member (IBM). As the example of DPL has shown 
(Contreras 2018), the lack of dedicated managerial and promotional resources can 
contribute to the failure of a pledge community to gain significant traction in the 
marketplace. 
                                                        
30 A similar supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI Exchange, an attempt to offer unitized 
licenses of pooled patents essential to certain industry standards. Like the EcoPC, IPXI failed to achieve 
significant take-up and eventually discontinued its operations (see Contreras, 2016). 
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The experience of the EcoPC, even though it did not realize its ambitious goals, has helped 
to advance our understanding of how patent commons can work and fail to work. As such, 
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Online appendix (not for publication) 






Variable Controls Ecopatents Difference (s.e.) p-value
Kruskal-
Wallis test p-value
Application year 1998.8 1997.8 -1.02 (0.39) 0.009 5.65 0.017
D (granted) 0.51 0.68 0.17 (0.04) 0.000 13.30 0.000
Grant lag in years* 4.63 4.14 -0.49 (0.30) 0.103 4.32 0.038
Family size 8.83 5.96 -2.87 (0.40) 0.000 43.19 0.000
Number of claims* 23.05 14.90 -8.15 (2.41) 0.000 9.63 0.000
Forward patent cites 27.24 15.92 -11.32 (2.28) 0.000 17.28 0.000
Backward patent cites 5.96 4.31 -1.65 (1.19) 0.167 8.49 0.004
Non-patent references 1.32 0.66 -0.66 (0.44) 0.136 0.10 0.758
Number of applicants 1.13 1.11 -0.02 (0.07) 0.765 0.18 0.673
Number of inventors* 2.83 2.91 0.07 (0.17) 0.675 3.61 0.057
* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.
Mean patent characteristics for 236 Eco-patents and 454 control patents
Variable Controls Ecopatents Difference (s.e.) p-value
Kruskal-
Wallis test p-value
Application year 1998.7 1997.6 -1.14 (0.40) 0.004 7.13 0.008
D (granted) 0.51 0.70 0.19 (0.04) 0.000 15.23 0.000
Grant lag in years* 4.60 4.14 -0.46 (0.31) 0.131 3.29 0.070
Family size 9.03 6.26 -2.78 (0.41) 0.000 37.56 0.000
Number of claims* 23.23 15.11 -8.11 (2.45) 0.001 9.17 0.003
Forward patent cites 28.30 17.23 -11.07 (0.38) 0.000 13.05 0.000
Backward patent cites 6.11 4.57 -1.53 (1.26) 0.223 9.23 0.002
Non-patent references 1.36 0.70 -0.66 (0.47) 0.161 0.19 0.665
Number of applicants 1.12 1.11 -0.01 (0.07) 0.844 0.21 0.649
Number of inventors* 2.82 2.97 0.14 (0.18) 0.425 6.36 0.012
* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.
Patents with nonzero forward cites only (437 controls; 218 eco-patents)










EcoPC Patent -0.87 (0.15) *** -0.65 (0.13) *** -0.65 (0.05) *** -0.45 (0.08) *** NOT
EcoPC Patent after 
donation -0.64 (0.29) ** -0.51 (0.22) ** --  -- IDENTIFIED
Decay Parameter 0.05 (0.68) 0.09 (0.02) ***
Diffusion Parameter 0.13 (0.28) 0.10 (0.01) ***
EcoPC Decay 





Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Significant at the one per cent (***), five per cent (**) and 10 per cent (*) levels.
no no
Semi-parametric Jaffe-Trajtenberg
Cites Cites Cites/Patent Cites Cites
Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between 1994 
and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three columns 
a priority year-citing year.
yes yes yes yes
3046 3046 512 512
Applicant cites only
-3,422.0 -2,212.4 -588.6 3,566.6
yes
512
Poisson Negative Binomial NLLS Poisson Poisson
yes yes no
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Appendix B: Additional figure 
Figure B-1 
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